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Abstract 
 
The paper re-investigates the determinants of China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
employing panel data analysis collecting between 2003 and 2014. The results highlight that the 
market-seeking variables as GDP, GDP Per Capita, and openness to trade have a positive impact 
on China’s OFDI. In addition, Chinese investors are likely to be not associated with economic 
growth of host countries. Importantly, the previous studies confirmed that only the rich natural 
resources and the weak institutions countries attracted China’s OFDI. However, we found out that, 
in recent years, not only weak institutions but also good institutions with rich natural resources 
countries attracted China’s OFDI. Moreover, China – ASEAN FTA and cultural proximity 
between the host country and China both have a significant positive effect of China’s OFDI. 
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1 Introduction 
China has been a capital-surplus economy for years but its outward investment has 
grown quickly in recent years. This phenomenon has generated many studies on the trends, 
motivations, and consequences of Chinese FDI. However, in early 2000s the majority of studies 
on China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) were mainly descriptive research or some 
comprehensive case studies on several high-profile Chinese MNEs like H. Liu and Li (2002), and 
Warner, Sek Hong, and Xiaojun (2004). These studies present simple descriptive data on China’s 
OFDI and/or theoretical arguments. They argued that international direct investment of Chinese 
companies was initially motivated by the Chinese government’s open door policy from 1978. 
Chinese MNEs invested abroad so as to acquire advanced technology and global brands, gain 
access to raw materials, energy and cheap labour markets, overcome international trade barriers, 
increase foreign exchange earnings, and avoid domestic competition. They also noticed that 
Chinese government had a strong influence on China’s OFDI (Taylor (2002), Deng (2003), Wong 
and Chan (2003), Poncet (2010), and Salidjanova (2011)). In addition, Morck, Yeung, and Zhao 
(2008) claimed that China’s very high saving rate, the practice of its dominant state-controlled 
banks, and the institution structure generated outward FDI. The lack of empirical studies on 
China’s OFDI can be attributed to data unavailability and the relatively small size of China’s 
OFDI compared to the country size. 
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Figure 1 presents the share of Chinese outflow FDI by geographical destinations in range 
of 2003 to 2014. In general, the proportion is not different between regions in the first period, 
2003 – 2008. Aftermath of global crisis, China’s OFDI increase sharply in ASEAN, European 
Union (EU), and North America. To explain this phenomenon, according to (MOFCOM, 2015), 
M&A activity of Chinese enterprises increase significantly in EU and North America, especially 
in United States to absorb and transfer technology more quickly. For ASEAN, in August 2009, 
China and ASEAN signed the Agreement on Investment. 
In recent years, the mobile capital increase due to large foreign exchange reserves and 
surplus of savings of China is an important part of China’s OFDI policy (Salidjanova, 2011). The 
China’s "going global" strategy in 2002 is an important advantage for Chinese enterprises goes 
abroad. As a result, in 2003, China’s overseas investors stood on twenty sixth in global (FDI 
flows), in 2014, however, the China ranked the third (Table 1). 
In the first stage of “going global” policy, Chinese enterprises only focus on the 
manufacturing and mining sectors to extract the natural resources. In recent years, however, 
China's OFDI has spread across the various sectors (Figure 1A in appendix). Especially, when 
the world's OFDI plummeted during the global economic crisis, 2007-2008, China's OFDI was 
still growing during this time. For example, China’s OFDI flows increased 25.3 percent and 110.9 
percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively (Table 1A). In addition, China’s OFDI is not only the 
diversified sectors, it also extends over many countries, including developing countries which  
account for a large proportion of 80%, the remaining is developed countries (MOFCOM, 2015). 
The previous studies show that China's OFDI flows to rich natural resource and weak 
institutional countries. The aim is to be met the supply of raw materials for China’s domestic 
production. 
Figure1: China’s OFDI flows by destination (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from China’s OFDI flows data, 2003-2014. 
In term of estimation methods, the previous studies, for example, Buckley et al. (2007) 
estimated the model by using the random effects model, and Zhang and Daly (2011) and Kang 
and Jiang (2012) using the pooled OLS and Cheung and Qian (2009) using the feasible 
generalized least squares. In our model, we include the first-order lagged time-variant 
independent variables, and use fixed effects model to solve endogenous problems partially. Our 
findings also differ from previous studies, firstly, China’ OFDI has come to the host countries 
having rich natural resources in not only weak institutions but also good institutions countries in 
developing countries. This is called “learning-by-investing”, when Chinese investors has 
experienced the extraction and performance in the developing countries owning the rich natural 
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resources and weak institutions in first stage of “going global”. After that, they have reached the 
developed countries who are also owning the rich natural resources. Secondly, China’s OFDI is 
not likely to pay attention to the GDP growth of host country. Lastly, at the first stage of China’s 
“going global” strategy, ASEAN is not likely to be destination of China’s OFDI, however, when 
China and ASEAN signed the investment agreement in August 2009, it has pushed China’s 
OFDI come back again. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review 
of determinants of China’ OFDI, the next section describes the strategic estimation and data 
using to estimate. Section 4 discusses and analyse the results of regression and the conclusions is 
the last section.   
2 Literature review 
The empirical literature on determinants of FDI in general is massive but there have 
been only a small number of empirical studies on China’s OFDI so far. Those studies can be 
divided into two categories of determinants: home factors and host factors.  
In terms of home factors, most of studies applied the Dunning (1981)’s Investment 
Development Path (IDP) theory. X. Liu, Buck, and Shu (2005) was, to the best of our knowledge, 
the first empirical attempt to analyse determinants of China’s OFDI. They showed that Chinese 
development level measured by GDP per capita and investments in human capital had a positive 
influence on China’s OFDI. Meanwhile, using annual FDI outflows of China over the period 
1987-2006, Wei and Alon (2010) revealed that US/RMB exchange rate and the number of patents 
registered in China had a negative impact on China’s OFDI while the opposite was true for 
annual imports and interest rate. Wang, Hong, Kafouros, and Boateng (2012) analysed the 
motives for China’s OFDI at firm-level by using data on Chinese firms in 2005 and 2006. Their 
empirical results indicated the important role of firm-industry factors (the degree of competition, 
foreign presence, and technological development within an industry) and institution-specific 
factors (favourable government regulatory policy and the level of state ownership in the firm) in 
explaining China’s OFDI. Also employing the IDP theory, You (2015) investigated the home 
determinants of China’s OFDI at regional level. A panel data for 30 Chinese regions from 2003 to 
2011 were employed. This was the first analysis that focused on China’s OFDI at regional level to 
confirm the important role of the extended IDP theory, home locational constraints, and 
government policies in China regional outward FDI. To be clearer, Chinese labour costs, trade 
balance, and pollution level had a negative impact on regional China’s OFDI whereas technology 
capability, infrastructure, and agglomeration effects positively affect regional China’s OFDI. 
These results were different from findings of Tolentino (2008). His analysis revealed that source’s 
country macroeconomic variables like income per capita, openness, interest rate, technology 
capability, exchange rate, exchange rate volatility did not Granger cause China’s OFDI. 
Regarding host factors, the research of Buckley et al. (2007) was one of the first attempts 
to empirically model Chinese outward direct investment. They examined the determinants of 
China’s OFDI, focusing on the impact of three special characteristics of Chinese economy: capital 
market imperfections, special ownership advantages, and institutional factors. The authors used 
panel data on approved China’s OFDI to 49 countries, over a 17-year period, from 1984 and 2001. 
They found that China’s OFDI increased with cultural proximity and geographical vicinity. 
Moreover, they also found that institutions and natural resources variables were only significant 
in the period between 1992 and 2001. The empirical results also showed that China’s OFDI was 
positively related to host countries’ bigger market size, higher inflation rate, poorer institutions, 
higher imports, and exports.  
Meanwhile, slightly different results were found in the research of Cheung and Qian 
(2009). In particular, they found that natural resources significantly attracted China’s OFDI 
whereas institutions were insignificant. China’s OFDI increased with host countries’ higher GDP 
and lower wages while the opposite is true for host countries’ GDP per capita. These authors 
investigated approved China’s OFDI to 31 nations from 1991 to 2005. They also attempted to use 
actual China’s OFDI over the period 2003-2005 but got a few significant results.  
 Cheng and Ma (2010) analysed actual China’s OFDI to 90 countries between 2003 and 
2006. Their empirical evidence revealed that host countries’ GDP and cultural and geographical 
proximity attracted China’s OFDI while landlocked nations discouraged China’s OFDI. However, 
they did not take into account variables indicating institutional quality nor natural resources.   
Interestingly, Kolstad and Wiig (2012) found the interaction effects between institutional 
environment and natural resources of host countries. To specify, countries with worse 
institutional quality but rich in natural resources were more attractive to China’s OFDI. Results 
on host countries’ GDP were in line with previous studies while other variables like distance, 
share of trade volume in GDP, distance, indicator for institution were all insignificant.  
 Aw and Lee (2008) constructed a theoretical model on firm location choice. Their model 
indicated that a firm’ location decision depended on fixed costs of establishing foreign 
subsidiaries, transportation and production costs, market size and the firm’s productivity level. 
Empirical results with data on Taiwanese firms in 2000 and multinomial logit model were in line 
with the predictions of the theoretical model. They showed that outward FDI increased with the 
productivity level of Taiwanese firms. 
The attractiveness of host country’ natural resources and institutions was further 
analysed in Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet (2012). Employing data on public listed Chinese 
MNEs during the period 2006-2008 and Poisson count data regression model, they found that 
firm ownership had a significant impact of the location choice of Chinese MNEs. State-controlled 
firms were attracted with natural resources and risky institutional environment. Meanwhile, 
private firms preferred bigger markets. Other variables showed similar results to previous 
studies such as distance, exports, and imports. These empirical results were similar to findings of 
Amighini, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo (2012) who also analysed the role of firm ownership on 
China’s OFDI between 2003 and 2008.  
 Chang (2014) examined determinants of China’s OFDI into 138 nations over a 7 year 
period, 2003-2009. An augmented gravity model with spatial linkages was applied in regression 
analysis to show that China’s OFDI was attracted by high-tech industries in developed nations 
and natural resources of host countries in general. The host country’s market size also had a 
significantly positive impact on China’s OFDI. Furthermore, the forms of China’s OFDI depended 
on the development level of host countries. Particularly, in developed countries Chinese firms 
were in favour of complex-vertical platform FDI while market seeking FDI was preferred in 
developing nations. In addition, the fuel extraction motive played a key role in China’s OFDI. 
 
 
3 Methodology and data 
3.1 Data 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics and data sources. The China’s OFDI flows panel 
data in range of 2003 to 2014 is taken from Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in various years. Next, the 
independent variables proxy for market-seeking as GDP, GDP Per Capita, GDP growth, and 
Openness to trade, inflation of host countries are from World Development Indicators (WDI) of 
World Bank and natural resources proxies for resource-seeking is also from WDI. We use 
institutions, rule of law institutions, to proxy for transaction costs in host countries affecting the 
destinations of Chinese investors, this data is from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of 
World Bank. Other transaction costs variable is common language equalling 1 if Chinese 
language is spoken at least 9 percent in both countries (China and host country) and we take it 
from CEPII3. Final, Other control variables as distance from capital of host country to China, and 
the host country locked by land also take from CEPII. 
3.2 Methodology 
We use three methods to estimate the panel data model including Pool OLS, Random 
effects, and fixed effects techniques. We use some tests to select the methods as Breusch and 
Pagan LM test for random effects, and Hausman test for choosing between fixed and random 
effects. In all model, the time-variant independent variables use the first-order lag to reduce 
endogenous problems. 
According to the previous studies (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung & Qian, 2009; Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2012; Zhang & Daly, 2011), our gravity equation suggests as follow 
China’s OFDIit = βGDPit + βGDPPit + βGDPGit + βTradeit + βInflationit + βInstitutionsit + βNRit 
+βftaASEANit + γControli +β0i +εit (1) 
In equation (1), our dependent variable is China’s outward FDI flows, which is i’s host 
country in year t in range of 2003 to 2014 for 154 host countries. We conduct it from annually 
Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward FDI, MOFCOM and this data measured by millions of 
dollars. 
The main independent variables relate to host country i’s institutions (Institutionsit), 
natural resources (NRit), and China-ASEAN FTA (ftaASEAN). The institutional variable is 
proxied by rule of law indicator from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of World Bank. 
This is important government indicators used in many studies to assess the government based on 
six sub-indicators including control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and 
absence of violence, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability. The range of 
index runs from -2.5 to 2.5, the higher index indicates that country has better 
institutions.Kolstad (2009) and Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006)highlighted that rent-seeking 
problems in resource rich countries can understand importantly via institutions, raw of law 
indicator. Therefore, a high economic growth as China has demanded the large raw resources. 
Additionally, China’s ODF driven by state-owned enterprises (MOFCOM, 2015). Whether the 
host country with weak rule of law institutions and rich natural resources is appealing to 
Chinese investors. Moreover, we check robustness with other institutional indexes of WGI. Next, 
the empirical large previous studies confirmed that China’s OFDI has extracted the raw 
resources from host country, in our model, the natural resources measured by fuels, ores, and 
metals exports as share of GDP. The positive relationship between the China’ OFDI and natural 
resources of host country is expected. The last, China – ASEAN FTA, in August 2009, two parties 
signed the investment agreement boosting the China’s OFDI flowing up into ASEAN. 
Next,GDPit, GDPPit, and GDPGit are gross domestic products (GDP), the GDP per capita, 
and annual GDP growth of each host country i in year t from World Development Indicators 
(WDI) of World Bank, respectively. The two former variables can be proxied for potential market 
size of host country. This is one of the important patterns of Chinese investors seeking the 
market. We expect they will impact positively on China’ OFDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung & 
Qian, 2009; Chou, Chen, & Mai, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Zhang & Daly, 2011). The latter 
reflect the economic growth of host countries, with high growth rate or increasing growth 
prospects, the FDI will flow to country because foreign investors can meet opportunities to be the 
country growing rapidly(Zhang & Daly, 2011).The positive relationship between the China’ OFDI 
and growth rates of host country is expected. 
The variable Tradeit, openness to trade indicator, is merchandise trade (sum of exports 
and imports of goods) measured as a share of GDP of host country i in year t. The openness to 
trade shows the capacity of economic integration to the rest of the world and the different levels 
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enter into world market. Other approach, Chakrabarti (2001) and Zhang and Daly (2011) used 
the openness to FDI measured as the host country’s inward FDI over GDP. We expect that it will 
influence the China’ OFDI (Chou et al., 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). 
The model adds a number of control variables as inflation, ASEAN, DIST, Comlang, 
Landlocked, OECD (see more details in Table 1). 
 Table1: Descriptive statistics of variables in model 
Variable Descriptive Source Mean SD Min Max 
OFDI China’s OFDI (millions of USD) MOFCOM 380.67 3212.07 -814.91 62823.78 
GDP Host country’s GDP (Billions of USD) WDI 506.85 1611.02 .27 17419.00 
GDPP Host country’s GDP Per Capita WDI 12486.77 16445.83 134.82 87772.69 
GDPG Host country’s annual growth rates (%) WDI 4.05 4.33 -36.05 34.50 
Trade Merchandise trade as share of GDP (%) WDI 71.70 47.53 16.45 419.45 
Inflation Inflation rate WDI 6.37 8.56 -25.31 103.82 
Institutions Rule of law WGI .11 .99 -1.92 2.12 
Natural Resources Fuels, ores, and metals exports as share of GDP (%) WDI 10.23 14.17 0 73.50 
InstitutionsNR Interaction between Institutions and Natural resources WDI -1.75 15.60 -89.14 62.88 
ASEAN 1 if host country is ASEAN member  .067 .25 0 1 
DIST Distance between capital of China and host country CEPII 8894.75 3995.00 955.65 19297.47 
Comlang 1 if a language in host country is spoken by at least 9% of the 
population in both countries 
CEPII .04 .19 0 1 
Landlocked 1 if host country is landlocked CEPII .18 .39 0 1 
OECD 1 if host country is OECD member WDI .24 .43 0 1 
N   1282    
4 Empirical results 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the determinants of China’s OFDI through 
various rules. In all the models, we added the year dummy variables in the model to control the 
fluctuations over the years and we dropped them out the Table 2. The column (1) and (2) of Table 
report the OLS results, random effects are next two columns, and the last two columns are fixed 
effects. In the column (2), (4), and (6), we interact the institutions variable and natural resources 
variable. To select the appropriate model, we implement the some test as Hausman test (value = 
183.79; p-value=0.000) favours the fixed effects models for time-variant independent variables 
and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (value = 1356.40; p-value=0.000) prefers 
random effects model for time-invariant variables to interpret the results.   
The China’s "going global" strategy launched in 2002 has encouraged a large number of 
Chinese enterprises investing abroad, especially state-owned enterprises. The first stage, 
Chinese investors mainly concentrated in the manufacturing and the mining sectors to extract 
rich natural resources meeting the demand for raw materials for the development of China's 
economy. In recent years, however, China’s OFDI has diversified the industries due to implement 
M&A activities in the world market to absorb and transfer technology (MOFCOM, 2015). 
Furthermore, our analysis also pays attention to the China’s outward investment strategy 
distinguishing between developed countries and developing countries. In our analysis, therefore, 
we divided into two samples to compare is OECD and Non-OECD. 
Table2: Results of analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS RE RE FE FE 
GDP (lag) 0.316*** 0.329*** 0.413*** 0.476*** 0.399* 0.553** 
 (4.67) (4.59) (3.29) (3.71) (1.66) (2.52) 
       
GDPP (lag) 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.046*** 0.026 0.652*** 0.412*** 
 (3.48) (3.22) (2.64) (1.45) (3.22) (2.89) 
       
GDPG (lag) -20.145 -23.762 -21.005 -21.243 -35.606** -22.979 
 (-1.40) (-1.56) (-1.07) (-1.12) (-2.04) (-1.51) 
       
Trade (lag) 38.685*** 37.828*** 47.882*** 44.903*** 75.708*** 62.950*** 
 (3.46) (3.52) (11.33) (10.49) (2.61) (2.58) 
       
Inflation (lag) 4.290 4.292 9.916 8.152 9.056 6.335 
 (0.64) (0.66) (1.07) (0.91) (1.47) (1.15) 
       
Institutions 
(lag) 
-315.353*** -584.287*** -419.280 -1424.901*** -152.406 -1968.582*** 
 (-2.86) (-2.76) (-1.51) (-4.71) (-0.39) (-2.92) 
       
Natural 
resources (lag) 
-18.110*** -13.572** 7.451 35.034*** 85.126*** 161.949*** 
 (-3.10) (-2.34) (0.68) (3.07) (2.73) (3.28) 
       
InstitutionsNR 
(lag) 
 22.459**  95.123***  180.479*** 
  (2.00)  (8.52)  (3.42) 
       
ASEAN -4220.515*** -4340.248*** -3730.666*** -4467.581***   
 (-3.38) (-3.40) (-4.50) (-5.22)   
       
ftaASEAN 730.320 667.667 732.589 535.543 892.819** 534.132 
 (0.86) (0.77) (1.42) (1.07) (2.23) (1.23) 
       
DIST -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.001 0.018   
 (-2.68) (-2.70) (-0.01) (0.38)   
       
Comlang_ethno 3860.901*** 3959.528*** 2112.300* 2585.646**   
 (3.28) (3.34) (1.69) (2.01)   
       
Landlocked -561.774*** -549.200*** -437.750 -478.836   
 (-2.86) (-2.87) (-0.99) (-1.05)   
       
OECD -964.678*** -663.748*** -1210.451* 159.457   
 (-3.34) (-2.81) (-1.83) (0.23)   
       
_cons -1664.903*** -1606.008*** -3281.783*** -3228.503*** -1.25e+04*** -9169.806*** 
 (-2.84) (-2.86) (-4.99) (-4.83) (-3.09) (-3.00) 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hausman test   183.79***    
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 1356.40***    
N 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282 1282 
R2 0.341 0.346   0.714 0.745 
T statistics in parentheses and using robust standard errors. 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
The results highlight that the variables related to market size as GDP and GDP Per 
Capita have a positive impact on China's OFDI and they are robust across all models. These 
results have also confirmed the previous studies. However, Chinese enterprises are not more 
likely to pay attention to the annual economic growth of host country, but also it has negatively 
relationship with China's OFDI (column 5 in Table 2). Compared with the study of Ramasamy et 
al. (2012), they found no evidence linking between the host country's growth rates and China's 
OFDI. We also cross-check the results with two samples, Non-OECD and OECD (Table 2A and 
3A in appendix), the results show that there are differences between these two groups, namely, 
GDP growth of Non-OECD countries negatively affect China's OFDI. On the other hand, we have 
the same conclusion with Ramasamy et al. (2012) for the OECD group. 
Next, the openness to trade of host country affect positively China's OFDI, meanwhile, 
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) found no effect with statistical significance to China's OFDI where they 
use the China’s OFDI data from 2003 to 2006. Moreover, we find that openness to trade of OECD 
countries having a negative impact on China's OFDI (Table 2A and 3A in appendix). Inflation of 
the host country does not affect China's OFDI. Our results also agree with Kolstad and Wiig 
(2012) and Ramasamy et al. (2012). 
We interpret the key variables in the model. China's OFDI is more likely to invest in host 
country having weak rule of law institutions when we add an interactive variable, 
InstitutionsNR (model 2, 4, and 6). In contrast, when we do not include the InstitutionNR 
variable in the model, the coefficient of rule of law institutions of host country is not significant 
(model 3, and 5). This result is consistent with the Non-OECD group and with OECD group; we 
do not find the relationship between the rule of law institutions and China's OFDI (Table 2A and 
3A in appendix). We also do robust check with the other indicators of WGI and the results do not 
change. Interestingly, the coefficient of rule of law interaction with natural resources variable is 
positive and significant. It implies that the strategy of China's OFDI has started to change; they 
have diversified the sectors and not just focused on the manufacturing and mining resources via 
M&A activities. Institutively, nowadays, the host countries have the rich natural resources and 
the better institutions, which have attracted China's OFDI. Our results contrast with previous 
studies that China's OFDI extract the raw resources from the host country’s weak institutions 
(Cheung, de Haan, Qian, & Yu, 2012; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, our results are also consistent with both groups; Non-OECD and OECD countries 
(model 6 of Table 2A and Table 3A in appendix). To check robustness, we estimated again 
according to method of Kolstad and Wiig (2012) for China's OFDI data from 2003 to 2006, the 
results coincide with the their conclusions4. 
To meet the needs of economic development, China demand for more raw materials. The 
strategy of China’ OFDI is resource-seeking in the first step. Our results coincide with the results 
of previous studies and concluded that the natural resource-rich countries are destinations for 
China's OFDI. Our results are consistent with non-OECD countries and the OECD, however, the 
signals are clearer in non-OECD countries (model 5 of Table 2A and 3A in Appendix). It can be 
concluded that Chinese enterprises invest in the host countries’ rich natural resources both 
developed and developing countries. 
With the China’s "going global" strategy, the ASEAN are not attractive region for 
Chinese investors. The results highlight that ASEAN negatively affects China's OFDI. However, 
since China and ASEAN have signed investment agreement in August 20095, China's OFDI 
began returning to ASEAN (ftaASEAN variable in model 5 of Table 2) and this signal is also seen 
as China's OFDI in the ASEAN increased suddenly in 2010 (Figure 1 in introduction section). 
Furthermore, we use common language variable, a Chinese language is spoken by at least 9% of 
the population in both countries, to proxy for culture proximity. The result influencing positively 
China's OFDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Ng & Tuan, 2002). Finally, other control variables such as 
distance, landlocked, and OECD variables have expected signs. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This study identified the determinants affecting China's OFDI, we have reviewed the 
evidences of the previous studies. First, the China’ OFDI were strongly influenced by the market 
size variables as GDP, GDP PerCapita, and openness to trade, conversely, Chinese investors 
were not more likely to pay much attention to GDP Growth of host countries. Cultural proximity 
had a positive impact on China's OFDI, Chinese enterprises have invested in host countries 
rating a large Chinese ethnicity in population as Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong 
SAR, and Malaysia(Buckley et al., 2007). Furthermore, the host countries with weak institutions 
or rich natural resources are still attractive destinations with China's OFDI. Second, 
interestingly, we found that China’s OFDI is gradually moving to rich natural resources in 
developed countries having good institutions. Finally, the China’s “going global” policy, initial, 
disoriented I the ASEAN. However, China’s OFDI have flowed significantly since the two parties 
signed the in August 2009. 
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Appendix 
Table1A: China's outward foreign direct investment flows and stock by year (billions of USD) 
Year Flows Stock 
Amount  Global 
ranking 
Y-o-Y 
Growth rates 
(%) 
Amount  Global 
ranking 
2002 2.70 26 — 29.90 25 
2003 2.90 21 5.6 33.20 25 
2004 5.50 20 93.0 44.80 27 
2005 12.26 17 122.9 57.20 24 
2006 21.16 13 43.8 90.63 23 
2007 26.51 17 25.3 117.91 22 
2008 55.91 12 110.9 183.97 18 
2009 56.53 5 1.1 245.75 16 
2010 68.81 5 21.7 317.21 17 
2011 74.65 6 8.5 424.78 13 
2012 87.80 3 17.6 531.94 13 
2013 107.84 3 22.8 660.48 11 
2014 123.12 3 14.2 882.64 8 
Source: China’s Ministry of Commerce, Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment (2015) 
Figure1A: China's outward FDI flows by industrial distribution, 2014 (billions of USD) 
 
Source: China’s Ministry of Commerce, Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment (2015) 
Table2A: The determinants of China’s Outward  Foreign Direct Investment Flows (Non-OECD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS RE RE FE FE 
GDP (lag) 1.629*** 1.615*** 1.124** 1.016* 0.258 0.489* 
 (3.97) (4.02) (2.11) (1.93) (1.01) (1.91) 
       
GDPP (lag) 0.041*** 0.025** 0.082*** 0.020 1.026*** 0.677*** 
 (3.27) (1.96) (3.04) (0.70) (3.40) (3.03) 
       
GDPG (lag) -29.271* -31.145* -27.359 -28.273 -37.746** -27.777 
 (-1.75) (-1.80) (-1.20) (-1.28) (-1.96) (-1.55) 
       
Trade (lag) 52.494*** 51.726*** 60.248*** 56.268*** 92.436*** 79.009*** 
 (3.72) (3.78) (11.54) (10.64) (2.95) (2.98) 
       
Inflation (lag) -0.500 -0.364 8.975 7.014 6.573 3.611 
 (-0.06) (-0.05) (0.85) (0.69) (0.94) (0.58) 
       
Institutions 
(lag) 
-645.502*** -850.668*** -738.546** -1752.481*** -177.151 -2194.386*** 
 (-3.55) (-3.15) (-2.25) (-4.96) (-0.39) (-2.88) 
       
Natural 
resources (lag) 
-31.532*** -23.314*** -6.843 35.735** 59.832** 154.964*** 
 (-3.65) (-2.70) (-0.53) (2.57) (2.04) (2.95) 
       
InstitutionsNR  22.004  107.754***  189.059*** 
  (1.64)  (7.91)  (3.38) 
       
ASEAN -4731.865*** -4864.921*** -4008.929*** -4839.474***   
 (-3.64) (-3.65) (-4.34) (-5.07)   
       
ftaASEAN 827.461 772.567 790.217 565.109 840.418* 504.824 
36.83 
18.29 
16.55 
15.92 
9.58 
6.6 
4.18 
3.4 
3.17 
2.04 
1.77 
1.67 
1.65 
0.55 
0.52 
0.24 
0.16 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Leasing and business service
Wholesale and retail trade
Mining
Finance
Manufacturing
Real estate
Transport, storage and postal Services
Construction
Information transmission / software and IT services
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery
Production and supply of electricity,heat,gas and water
Scientific research and technical service
Residents service, repair and other services
Water conservancy, environment and public facility…
Culture, sports and entertainment
Accommodation and Catering
Other Industries
 (0.95) (0.87) (1.35) (1.00) (1.84) (1.01) 
       
DIST -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.004 0.040   
 (-2.88) (-2.67) (-0.07) (0.69)   
       
Comlang_ethno 1971.774** 2229.144*** 287.111 1499.442   
 (2.49) (2.74) (0.20) (1.02)   
       
Landlocked -112.107 -171.445 91.917 -285.451   
 (-0.74) (-1.09) (0.17) (-0.50)   
       
_cons -2424.418*** -2388.317*** -4214.762*** -4229.580*** -1.11e+04*** -9387.174*** 
 (-2.98) (-3.01) (-5.29) (-5.23) (-3.31) (-3.39) 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 984 984 984 984 984 984 
R2 0.390 0.393   0.743 0.772 
T statistics in parentheses and using robust standard errors. 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
  
Table3A:The determinants of China’s Outward  Foreign Direct Investment Flows (OECD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS RE RE FE FE 
GDP (lag) 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.174*** 0.148*** 0.943*** 0.945*** 
 (2.79) (2.85) (5.45) (5.65) (3.79) (3.80) 
       
GDPP (lag) 0.012** 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.004 -0.002 
 (2.02) (1.63) (0.93) (1.26) (0.08) (-0.05) 
       
GDPG (lag) 48.077** 48.801** 34.014 35.085* 10.956 4.406 
 (2.44) (2.43) (1.60) (1.65) (0.52) (0.19) 
       
Trade (lag) -3.170* -2.603* -3.771 -2.822 -12.188** -10.843* 
 (-1.94) (-1.76) (-1.41) (-1.22) (-2.03) (-1.69) 
       
Inflation (lag) 39.775 33.214 -9.600 -3.114 -32.432 -30.102 
 (1.64) (1.39) (-0.36) (-0.12) (-1.38) (-1.27) 
       
Institutions (lag) 3.375 -177.763 80.137 -95.059 2.525 -339.472 
 (0.03) (-1.03) (0.34) (-0.41) (0.01) (-0.73) 
       
Natural resources 
(lag) 
27.956 -73.698 34.420* -42.105 92.788*** -27.405 
 (1.58) (-1.43) (1.78) (-0.63) (3.79) (-0.43) 
       
InstitutionsNR  68.311  47.380  80.048* 
  (1.55)  (1.12)  (1.89) 
       
DIST -0.009 0.001 -0.007 0.006   
 (-0.54) (0.07) (-0.21) (0.20)   
       
Landlocked 203.666* 245.247** 401.031 339.309*   
 (1.95) (2.14) (1.62) (1.68)   
       
_cons -526.973** -329.325 -418.043 -329.883 -441.028 152.758 
 (-2.17) (-1.01) (-0.99) (-0.88) (-0.34) (0.12) 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 298 298 298 298 298 298 
R2 0.359 0.368   0.657 0.660 
T statistics in parentheses and using robust standard errors. 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
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